



KNOWLEGE.... LIBERTY.... UTILITY.... REPRESENTATION.... RESPONSIBILITY.

VOL. I.

PHILADELPHIA, SEPTEMBER 24, 1834.

NO. 15.

*From the Globe.*

SENATOR SOUTHARD.

This dignitary, we understand, has lately employed himself in perambulating the State of New Jersey, denouncing the President for the removal of the deposits, and charging him with usurpation, violation of the constitution and laws, and multiplied acts of tyranny. It is natural that this man should hate General Jackson, because, many years ago, he slandered him at a public table in Virginia, and afterwards received from him a rebuke which made him tremble and turn pale. Now he is impelled by conscious guilt and implacable hatred—a hatred natural to bad men towards those whom they have wantonly wronged.

But it is not our purpose to discuss that topic. We wish merely to call the attention of the public to certain *real usurpations* and violations of law committed by Mr. Southard *himself* during his administration of the Navy Department, that the People of New Jersey may judge of the motives by which he is now actuated.

*Item.* Mr. Southard declaims loudly against the claim of the President, as the Executive authority, to the custody of the public property, and the right to transfer the public money from one Bank to another, charging him with seizing the public treasure, although not a dollar of it ever comes to his hands, or to his credit in the Banks. But how was it with Mr. Southard, when he was in power?

As an Executive officer, he had the custody of all the cannon and cannon shot, as well as other munitions of war and public property accumulated for the service of the Navy. *On one occasion, he delivered the property of the public in cannon and cannon shot to Gen. Mason, of Georgetown, D. C. FOR PURPOSES OF PRIVATE SPECULATION, to the amount of about TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS.* Other cannon and cannon shot were to be returned in their place; and in the mean time, Gen. Mason was to deposit and did deposit, the cost of this public property in the Branch Bank in this city, to MR. SOUTHARD'S OWN CREDIT. It was *about eighteen months* before Gen. Mason had completed the deliveries replacing this property, and received the whole of this money back from Mr. Southard! Thus did this man, *in gross violation of law*, convert twenty-five thousand dollars worth of public property into money, and *cause the money to be paid over to him, or placed to his credit in the Bank, which is the same thing!* Whether he used it or not, we do not know, because we have not access to his Bank account; but it was used either by him or the Bank.

Now, we ask the people of New Jersey whether the *President*, or Mr. *Taney*, has committed any such outrage? When have they disposed of public property without authority at law, or put any sum of public money into their own pockets? If it were discovered that the President, or any one of the Secretaries, now had to his credit in Bank, twenty-five thousand dollars of the public money which he could check for and use at will, how loudly would Mr. Southard and the rest of the *honest wigs* trumpet the monstrous abuse from Maine to Louisiana?

Mr. Southard has great assurance. Conscious of this and many other abuses, equally aggravated, he is the loudest in his denunciations of the present administration for shifting the public money from one Bank to others, not taking it from the credit of the Treasurer, or bringing a dollar of it within their own grasp.

*From the London Times.*

THE CONSULTATION.

"When they do agree, their unanimity is wonderful."—THE CRITIC.

*Scene discovers Dr. Whig and Dr. Tory in consultation. Patient on the floor between them.*

*Dr. Whig.*—This wild Irish patient *does* pester me so,  
That what to do with him, I'm curst if I know.  
I've promis'd him anodynes—

*Dr. Tory.*—Anodynes! Stuff.

Tie him down—gag him well—he'll be tranquil enough.

That's *my* mode of practice.

*Dr. Whig.*—True, quite in *your* line,  
But unluckily not much, till lately in *mine*.  
"Tis so painful—

*Dr. Tory.*—Pooh, nonsense—ask Ude how he feels,  
When, for Epicure feasts, he prepares his live eels,  
By fling them in, 'twixt the bars of the fire,  
And letting them wriggle on there till they tire.  
He, too, says "tis painful"—quite makes his heart bleed"—

But "your eels are a vile, oleaginous breed"—  
He would fain use them gently, but Cookery says "No,"

And-in short-eels were *born* to be treated just so.  
"Tis the same with these Irish—who're odder fish still—

Your tender Whig heart shrinks from using them ill; I, myself, in my youth, ere I came to get wise, Used, at some operations, to blush to the eyes;— But, in fact, my dear brother—if I may make bold To style you, as Peachum did Lockit, of old,— We, Doctors, *must* act with the firmness of Ude, And indifferent, like him,—so the fish is *but* stew'd, Must torture live Pats, for the general good.

[Here patient groans and kicks a little.]

*Dr. Whig.*—But what, if one's patient's so devilish perverse, That he won't be thus tortured?

*Dr. Tory.*—Coerce, Sir, Coerce.

You're a juv'ile performer, but once you begin, You can't think how fast you may train your hand in:

And [smiling] who knows but old Tory may take to the shelf,

With the comfort that, while he retires on his shelf, He's succeeded by one just as—bad as himself!

*Dr. Whig* [looking flattered.]—Why, to tell you the truth, I've a small matter here.

Which you helped me to make for my patient last year.—

[Goes to a cupboard, and brings out a straight waistcoat and gag.]

And such rest I've enjoy'd from his raving, since then,

That I've made up my mind he shall wear it again.

*Dr. Tory* [embracing him.]—Oh, charming!—My dear Dr. Whig, you're a treasure,

Next to torturing myself, to help you is a pleasure.

[Assisting Dr. Whig.]

Give me leave—I've some practice in these mad machines—

There—tighter—the gag in the mouth, by all means, Delightful:—all's snug—not a squeak need you fear,—

You may now put your anodynes off till next year.

[Scene closes.]

\*This eminent artist in the second edition of the work wherein he propounds this mode of purifying his eels, professes himself much concerned at the charge of inhumanity brought against his practice, but still begs leave respectfully to repeat that it is the only proper mode of preparing eels for the table.

MEETINGS.

GENERAL WARD COMMITTEE.

The Democratic General Ward Committee, will meet by adjournment, at the Supreme Court Room, on THURSDAY, Sept. 25, at seven and a-half o'clock, P. M.

F. STOEVER, Ch'n. pro. tem.

J. A. PHILLIPS, } *Secretaries.*  
V. L. BRADBORD, }

SOUTHWARK.—*Jackson, Democracy, and no Bank.*—The Democrats of Southwark, friendly to the General and State Administrations, will meet at the Southwark Hall, on Thursday evening, the 2d of October, at 7 o'clock.

LOWER DELAWARE WARD.—A meeting of the Democratic citizens of this Ward will be held at the house of Henry Meyers corner of Fifth and Race streets, THIS evening, 24th inst. at half past seven o'clock, for the purpose of nominating an Assessor, two Assistant Assessors, and Inspectors of the General Election.

SOUTHWARK.—*Jackson, Sutherland, and Democracy!*—A meeting of the Democrats of Southwark, will be held on Monday evening October 13th, at 7 o'clock, at the Commissioners' Hall.

If the weather should prove favorable the meeting will be held back of the Hall.

YOUNG MEN OF LOCUST WARD, TO THE RESCUE.—Attention!—The Young Democratic Republicans of Locust Ward, entitled to the right of suffrage, are requested to meet at the house of Jas. H. Hutchinson, on Thursday evening next the 25th inst. at half past seven o'clock, to make arrangements to secure the success of the democratic party.—It is hoped every Young Man will give his attendance.—Several addresses will be delivered.

PUBLIC MEETING.—The Democratic Naturalized Irish citizens of the District of Southwark and Township of Moyamensing, friendly to the election of Joel B. Sutherland, are requested to meet at the house of John Paisely, in Sixth above Shippen street, THIS evening at 7 o'clock.

SOUTH WARD.—Democracy and our Country for Ever.—The Democratic citizens of South Ward, friends of the Constitution and the present patriotic Administration of the Country, and opposed to the grasping designs of the Bank of the United States and its seditious and aristocratic allies, will meet at the South Ward Hotel, south east corner of George and Eleventh Streets, THIS evening, for the purpose of selecting Judges for the Ward Election, Inspectors of the General Election and Assessors, to be supported at the ensuing Ward and General Elections.

Several addresses are also expected.

By order of the Delegates.

LIBERTY AND EQUALITY.

*Jackson, Sutherland, and Democracy.*

YOUNG MEN of Southwark, Moyamensing, and Passyunk.—Attention! A General Meeting of the Young Men of Southwark, Moyamensing and Passyunk—opposed to the usurpations of a Monied Aristocracy, and determined to maintain their rights as Freemen, and friendly to the principles of Jefferson, Jackson, and Democracy—will be held in the open space at the juncture of Catharine and Sixth Streets, and Passyunk Road, on Thursday evening the 25th inst. at 7 o'clock. A number of addresses will be delivered on the occasion.

DEMOCRATIC DELEGATION, N. L.—The Delegates elected in the respective Wards of the Northern Liberties, by the Democratic Citizens friendly to the General and State Administrations, for the purpose of forming a Commissioners' ticket for the District—are particularly requested to meet at the Northern Exchange, N. Third street, on Thursday evening, the 25th inst. at seven o'clock, to enter upon the duties assigned to them, by their Democratic fellow citizens.

SOUTHWARK

COMMITTEE OF NATURALIZATION.

Notice is given to all persons who may wish to become naturalized, that by making application to any of the undenominated Democratic citizens, all necessary information will be given.

Richard Palmer, Sr. South 2d street, three doors below Shippen.  
Jesse R. Burden, South 3d street, below South.

Wm. J. Crans, junction of 5th street and Passyunk road.

Col. Lemuel Paynter, German, a few doors below 5th street.

Joseph M. Doran, 4th street, above Plum.

John Keefe, Federal street, above Front.

Henry Mandefield, corner of John street and South 2d.

Lewis F. Garwick, corner of 6th and Carpenter.

John W. Ryan, George street, below South.

The Committee meets every Tuesday evening, at Mrs. Moose's, in Front street, near Mead alley.



PUBLISHED BY WILLIAM DUANE.

PHILADELPHIA, SEPT. 24, 1834.

## ASPECTS OF ELECTIONS.

We seldom meddle with distant elections till we know for certainty the results. This we do to discourage betting; a practice too frequent, and always abominable. There is *money* now going the rounds, in which the *Bank goes snacks*, of which we may talk when it cannot be suspected of intention to affect the election.

Of our three Districts we shall speak not with the censure of cunning, but with the candor of public integrity.

Of the First District, there can be no doubt whatever; Dr. Sutherland will be elected by a greater majority than on any former occasion; and for two reasons:

The Bank is opposed to him.

Poor Jemmy Gowen is what General Barker used to describe with rich pungency: Poor Jemmy is a *figure 9 with the tail cut off*—that is, as they would say at *Cuina-mara*, “naught from nothing and nothing remains,” and such will be Poor Jemmy’s luck.

In the Third District, as the inimitable *Power* describes his sweetheart of Kilkenny:

“Her cheeks are like roses,  
Her lips . . . . much the same,  
—Or like a dish of ripe strawberries  
Smothered in cream.”

General *Ash* will have the *strawberries*, and Col. *Wat-mough*, who if he had acted with his constituents, and not with the adversaries of public liberty and law, might have represented the honest people of the Third District as long as he lived. He will now have time to cultivate his own cabbages, and avoid those heart-aches and the thousand ills to which flesh is heir to.

In the Second District, we frankly say, that if the *working people* particularly are true to themselves, the *Federal* Ticket can have no chance; but if the *seduction* has been as successful as the effort, if the *secret societies for proscription* established in every ward, and which are bound to report to the *Mayor*; if they are as successful in this District as the Bank was in the Senate, we shall have a Democratic minority in the city. *Squeamish* people will not like this candor—but it is in the power of the citizens to produce a different result.

## RICHES.

This word is constantly confounded with *wealth*—and it is not surprising that it should be so, for the *most renowned DICTIONARIES* to which, from youth to age, we refer as to an *oracle* of old; are in numerous words, and the words *riches* and *wealth*, specially, are totally deceptive and false.

For example: The *ursa major* of Dictionary makers, Dr. Johnson, has these words, thus set down—

**RICH**, [rīch, Fr. rīca, Saxon.] 1. Wealthy, 2. Abounding in wealth, 3. Abounding in money or possessions, 4. Valuable, 5. Estimable, 6. Precious, 7. Splendid, 8. Having ingredients or qualities in a great quantity or degree, 9. Fertile, fruitful.

**RICHES**, [rīches, Fr.] 1. Wealth, 2. Money, 3. Possessions, 4. Splendid, sumptuous appearance.

**WEALTH**, [wēlth, Saxon.] 1. Happiness, 2. Prosperity, 3. Flourishing state, 4. Riches, 5. Money, 6. Precious goods.

**WEALTHY**, [wēlthy, Saxon.] 1. Rich, 2. Opulent, 3. Abundant. Now, these *explanations* confound; they do not discriminate between the precise signification of words, and the same words used metaphorically; and use terms of

contrary meanings as synonymous. *Wealth* is *happiness, prosperity*; and these are true definitions. But *wealth* and *riches* are not co-significant, because a man may be very happy without riches—and very rich without being happy. All the definitions of *rich* and *riches*, are correct, but those which confound them with wealth. Money and possessions are riches; but they do not necessarily produce happiness, which is the only proper meaning of wealth.

There are many *errors* current, as well as *promises to pay*, which are not paid. If Brown, who wrote *Vulgar Errors*, were to come again upon the theatre of society, he would find *errors enough*, now current, to fill a book as large as his original work.

There are great errors prevalent concerning riches, in ancient and modern times. A late Spanish writer, (and when a Spaniard becomes clever, he usually equals the cleverest men of any country;) a late Spanish writer compares the products of the South American mines with the coal mines of England, and he estimates them at the following sums:

Gold and silver of South America,	220,500,000
Coal mines of England,	450,000,000

This estimation is probably under-rated, as to South America: and over-rated as to the coal mines of England. But it presents a subject for comparison that is instructive; and we may apply it to our own circumstances—the gold of the southern States, and the coals of Pennsylvania. We have not data even for an approximation; but the hint may invite the attention of those that have opportunities.

There are many misapprehensions on the subject of the precious metals, in ancient as well as modern times. From the early histories of Asiatic Greece, Persia, &c. the riches in the precious metals appear enormous, compared with modern times; but the disparity is to be found in the greater extension of arts and commerce, in modern times.

Historians say that *Cadmus*, an emigrant from Phoenicia, (Canaan,) opened the first mines of Pangaeus, in Thrace, 1594 years before the Christian era.

David and Solomon, we are told, brought from Africa, to the amount in gold and silver, of \$4,000,000,000. Solomon, in a single year, collected \$1,500,000.

The gold that covered the *sanctum sanctorum*, was equal to \$1,150,000.

It is said, (1 Kings, ch. ix. verses 2, 8,) that ships from Ophir, imported by the Red Sea, \$1,000,000.

But Chronicles (2 Chron. c. viii. v. 18,) represent the amount nearly half as much more.

It appears from Diodorus, that the founder of Nineveh was inordinately rich; and that the builder of Babylon erected statues of *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and *Rhea*, of beaten gold; that of Jupiter forty feet high, and weighing 1000 Babylonian talents. That of Rhea was of the same height, seated on a throne of gold, having a lion on each side, and one on her knees—and near them, two vast serpents of silver, weighing thirty talents.

The statue of Juno weighed 800 talents, and an altar of gold, fifteen feet long and fifteen feet broad, weighed 500 talents, and on the altar, two cups of gold, weighing each 30 talents, and two censors, weighing 300 talents.

The value of these accumulations of the precious metals, are estimated by Abbé Barthelemy, at 55,000,000 dollars.

The wealth of *Cæsarius*, king of Lydia, is proverbial among school-boys; his epocha, 540, before Christ—his riches, were estimated at \$15,000,000.

Pytheus, a petty chief in Phrygia, when Xerxes invaded Greece, (470, B. C.) entertained the whole Persian army. Larcher estimates his riches at \$18,000,000.

When Pericles stirred up the Athenians to war against Peloponnesus (431, B. C.) the money in the treasury was equal to \$6,000,000.

Alexander, in his invasion of Persia, collected \$336,000,000.

Ptolemy Philadelphus, of Egypt, accumulated gold and silver, to the amount of \$758,000,000.

The house of *Marius*, the dictator, was purchased by *Cornelia*, for seventy-five drachmas, or \$81,060.

Tiberius Cesar left, at his death, \$108,984,375.

Apicius, a Roman citizen, expended in voluptuous entertainments, \$2,422,900.

This same Apicius, finding his riches reduced to \$403,645, committed suicide, from the apprehension of starving!

The mines of Athens were worked by slaves; and an insurrection of those slaves, in the mines of Sunium, had nearly overturned the republic. The mines were never afterwards worked.

Andalusia, in Spain, was the great mining country of Europe. 1100 B. C. there were gold washings in the Sierra Morena, and in the Guadalquivir.

We had proposed to give a general sketch of the riches of antiquity, and to pursue it down to the repeated plunder of India, by *Jenghis*, and *Timour*, and *Baber*, and their successors, the *Moguls*; but we find the heads alone would occupy too much space: so we postpone it to another occasion.

The view we contemplate by this short exhibit, is to induce the young reader, not to depend upon what is so often said about the *superabundance*, or the *too great scarcity* of gold and silver.

From these historical data, it will be seen, there was more gold and silver in the world then, than appears now, or than America has produced for three hundred years. That as *Cæsarius*, the richest man of his day, was not *wealthy*, we must use the terms *wealth*, and *riches* in separate senses.

From the *Utica Observer*.

In a letter of Thomas Jefferson, to Judge Sullivan, dated May 21, 1805, he says, “I cannot but congratulate you on the advance it (the election) manifests, and the certain prospect it offers that another year restores Massachusetts to the general body of the nation. You have indeed received the Federal unction of lying and slandering. But who has not? Who will ever again come into eminent office unaccompanied with this chiasm? It seems to be fixed that falsehood and calumny are to be their ordinary engines of opposition.”

No man ever understood the Federal alias Whig party better than Jefferson. He foresaw with the certainty of intuition what would be their future conduct: and he did not hesitate to declare his firm conviction that no republican would ever be permitted to come into “eminent office” without receiving “the Federal unction of lying and slandering.”

EXPERIENCE thus far has verified the correctness of his opinion. No one has had “to bear up against the brutal hacking and hewings of the heroes of Billingsgate,” more than our present venerable President. He has received a full measure of the “Federal unction of lying and slandering;” yet to use again the language of Jefferson, he knows that—“the Patriot, like the Christian, must learn that to bear revilings and persecutions is a part of his duty; and in proportion as the trial is severe, firmness under it becomes more requisite and praiseworthy.” For “if we suffer ourselves to be frightened from our post by mere lying, surely the enemy will use the weapon; for what one so cheap to those of whose system of politics morality makes no part?”

THE PRESENT COMPUTATION OF YEARS ERRO-  
NEOUS.

“The recent eclipse of the moon,” says a foreign observer, “has been defective by no fewer than three years. Correctly speaking, the year 1834 should be 1837; for Josephus tells us, that shortly before the death of Herod, during whose government our Saviour was born, there occurred an eclipse of the moon, on the night of the 12th or 13th of March; and it has been astronomically demonstrated that this eclipse took place in the 4th year preceding the Christian computation of time; consequently modern chronology is three whole years in error.”

## REVIEW.

## GOLD CURRENCY.

A LECTURE ON MONEY AND CURRENCY, with an examination of the recently enacted Gold Coin Bill; Delivered in the Lecture Room of the Franklin Institute, of the City of Philadelphia, on the 3d of July, 1834: By WILLIAM REED.—With an Appendix, containing the Act concerning the Gold Coins of the United States, &c., and a Table of the comparative Value of all Foreign Gold Coins, which are legal tenders. New York: Stodart, Courtland Street. For the Proprietor.—pp. 33.

(Continuation.)

The incoherency of the production which we have undertaken to examine, has rendered the review as dry and desultory as the lecture itself; and did not the examination afford opportunities for the development of practical knowledge, it would not have merited the occupation of a single column. It consists of old errors, errors long exploded, and of many new misconceptions of principles, misapplications of words, and utter confusion of mind.

We have, in the progress of our review, demonstrated these truths; and if a right understanding of Political Economy, be what the lecturer declared it to be, in his very opening,—“There is no science which comes so directly hope to the every-day occupations of mankind.” Then it is as necessary to remove mystery and error, propagated under its name, as to promote correct ideas of its nature, uses, and application.

Let us then see what the lecturer says upon the nature and objects of Political Economy, page 3, “The objects of the science, (Pol. Econ.) is to point out the means best adapted for the production of necessities, conveniences, and luxuries, which constitute wealth; to ascertain the circumstances most favorable for their accumulation, and to explain the manner in which it is distributed among the different classes of the community.”

It is not because this extract contains a just and rational definition, that we copy it; in truth, it is not a definition—it is a mistake as to the object—it is a misinterpretation in the very terms. We shall just point out its discrepancies, and then present the *earliest* of all authorities, for a true definition—true at this day, as when Aristotle uttered it.

The production of necessities, conveniences and luxuries, is the province of the useful arts, and the result of a ripe skill; but though necessities &c. contribute to *wealth*, it is not in the sense in which the lecturer employs it; he misapplies the word, by using it in the sense of *riches*; but riches do not constitute wealth, which signifies happiness or prosperity in the enjoyment of competency and contentment, which alone constitute wealth: for a man may be very rich—possess abundance, and abound in luxuries, without being *wealthy*, since *happiness* alone is wealth. The second sentence of the lecturer accords with the ideas we here express, though it is at variance with the sentence which it follows; the accumulation of *riches* (not wealth,) undoubtedly belongs to Political Economy; but the distribution is not a part of the science, as it is called; distribution implies a distributor, or some rule of distribution; now, that being the business of every individual, governed wholly by his own judgment, it is no more a branch of general economy than making shoes or gimblets; which occupations, and the numerous others which fill up the crowds of society, have each and every a peculiar rule for himself, and is wholly independent of any general law; the definition might have applied to the general state of society when all was *feudal*, and the baron calculated the circumstances most favorable for accommodation—and then the distribution had a distributor—that is, the lord among his vassals, according to their classes. These circumstances do not apply to several European nations—they are utterly at variance with our free institutions, where every man is his own accumulator and distributor.

So much for the lecturer. Aristotle says—“Every political society forms a sort of commonwealth or partnership, instituted for the benefit of the partners. Utility is the end and aim of every such institution; and the greatest and most extensive utility is the aim of the great association called a commonwealth.”

In this state we find in a family the rudiments of the economy of a state. Different families produce different commodities, and commerce grows out of the necessity and utility of exchanging or selling the surplus of production; and experience and expertness give permanency to the several productive arts; and the perfection of the methods pursued in producing and exchanging, being governed wholly by the circumstances, numbers, and wants, this experience carried into practice, is domestic economy extended to society.

In the time of Dyonisius, a Sicilian banker purchased all the grain, and raised the price of the article to an inordinate extent, profiting by his monopoly, no less than fifty talents. When Dyonisius was apprised of the transaction, he suffered the monopolist to retain his extorted riches, but he banished him, because he employed a mode of accumulation inconsistent with the *Political Economy* of the state.

During the wars of the French revolution we had some examples of the same description. Certain merchants whose fortunes were in the clouds, but to whom for their hostility to Democracy the coffers of *two or three Banks* were opened, employed agents at every mill in the State and in some of the neighboring States, and purchased up all the wheat and flour. The barrel of flour averaged \$4. when this project was begun. Flour was raised to \$14. a barrel. Had gold and silver been the currency, this outrage and plunder of the industrious could not have been perpetrated. The man who had earned by his week's industry *ten dollars*, when flour was at four dollars, lived in some comfort; but when by the aid of *paper* the poor man was compelled to pay four dollars more than his weeks wages, society was deeply aggrieved. We had no Dyonisius, to punish or banish those robbers. The speculation was frustrated by the vicissitudes of war. The accumulations of flour were so enormous, that lofty stores, five or six stories high, were necessary to contain them, which the rapacious speculators were waiting for some calamity of war in Europe, to enable them to enhance the price of flour. But events in Europe did not take the direction that was wished for; a rumor of peace, which proved to be fallacious, tumbled down the fragile palace of paper speculation; flour suddenly fell for ten days, to eight dollars, but to rise again in consequence of the discovery that the flour in the magazines of monopoly was no longer merchantable. It had become sour, and much of it was shipped to England to be converted into starch, and sold at two to three dollars a barrel. But this speculation upon flour, which could not have occurred if gold and silver had been the currency, but which was accomplished by *paper*, taxed the working men of Philadelphia, *ten dollars a barrel*, to accommodate speculators, who began and finished their career, *bankrupts*, leaving the *paper-manufacturers* of public affliction, *minus* the amount of their paper loans.

Thus the banks themselves furnished a Dyonisius—and like the angry demon of the Jews, destroyed those whom they had created for destruction.

We could specify all the parties in those transactions; we were the present witnesses. But the facts are enough, though there are many still living who felt the calamity without being aware that the *causes were among ourselves*.

These facts go directly to the foundation of Political Economy, by showing, that as societies are formed for *mutual protection*, it belongs to the province of legislation, to preserve from injury by monopolies at home, as well as to defend against aggressions from abroad.

Political Economy, therefore, is not described by the lecturer; it is not “to ascertain the circumstances most favorable to accumulation; it is not to explain the distribution of wealth among the different classes of the community; and when the lecturer, in p. 4, observes that—

“No science has been treated with such frigid indifference, not to say contumely and contempt;” he only leads the judicious observer to reflect on the causes of this indifference on a subject so vital to society, and to smile at the hyperbole of the lecturer, since no subject which concerns society, has had a more active and various share in the disquisitions of those who are called *par excellence* the LEARNED, than this same topic. If it has not reached some degree of *certainty*, if *error* has not been superseded, and *truth* established, it is not from neglect nor indifference, nor want of numbers; not less than 100 Italian writers, produced a collection of more than fifty large octavo volumes, containing only a part of the publications on Political Economy, in Italy, commencing so early as 1558. In France, where the *economists* rose, the first spring of their system was to provide *revenue* for the wars of extravagant despots; the theories of those days borrowed largely from the Italians, and superseded them for a long time in Europe. More than one hundred and forty French authors have mixed up and compounded the misinterpreted ideas of Aristotle and the Italians.

To some the system of the *economists*, which dominated over the imagination of Europe, was superseded by a new sect, who condemned both French and Italian economists, and built up a new fabric with the materials of their predecessors. The volumes published by English (including Scots,) writers, exceed two hundred!—The volumes on the subject, in Europe, including Spain and Germany, amount to more than five hundred!

Yet according to our lecturer no science has excited so little attention; the real truth is, that no object of human inquiry, (superstition only excepted,) ever obtained so many votaries; and even at this day, when such incoherency characterizes all the books and lectures on the subject, this modern *material metaphysics*, obtains for its professors the first men in the most famous universities, where it is lectured upon and illuminated into darkness with the same zeal and infatuation as the metaphysics in the schools of philosophy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

That it has been treated by men of large intellect, with contempt, is not at all surprising—if the number of writers, the number of volumes, and the utter contradiction, and uncertainty, which pervades them all be considered, when *Whateley*, (the present archbishop of Dublin,) who mounted into the episcopal chair upon the shoulders of his economical professorship, thus speaks of this absurdity called science:—

“It might be expected that there would be as little difference between the political economists as among the mathematicians; that, being agreed in their premises, they would not differ in their conclusions. But as the terms of that *science!* are drawn from common discourse, and seldom carefully defined by the writers who employ them, *hardly one of them that has any settled and invariable meaning*, and their ambiguities are perpetually overlooked. The principal terms are only seven—*value, wealth, labor, rent, wages, and profits.*”

After which the learned Professor puts forth his invariable meanings of those seven words, too verbose for insertion here, but of which a future course of lectures, to be begun after the election, we shall give at large, with a commentary.

For the present purpose, it is sufficient to say, as part of the account of the contempt into which *the science* has fallen, that the *right reverend lecturer*, is as far from an invariable meaning, or a careful definition, as any of his contemporaries, and the very selection of words which he has given, show, that he is a mere copyist of Adam Smith. We might here recur to the clear and explicit exposition

of the causes of indifference and contempt, furnished by Sir James Mackintosh.

The lecturer exhibits in his eulogy on the French economist, Say, a proof of the uncertainty of his own notions, than which perhaps, excepting it be Malthus or Ricardo, there is no example of mistake so comprehensively amplified, or plain truth so discolored or mystified.

This lecturer's ninth page, though perhaps he did not know it, is merely a paraphrase of Book i. c. 6, of *Aristotle* in *Gillie's* version, only that the version of the Stagyrite is much more lucid and rational.

We have said as much as was necessary to guard against the false notions of Mr. Reed's lecture, and made our review the medium of a better development, since in exposing misconception, and exemplifying truth, we render a double service, to all who are not deliberately determined to refuse knowledge.

#### A POWER SUPERIOR TO LAW AND CONSTITUTION.

The Nashville Republican contains a correspondence of a most extraordinary and insolent character; we shall give it at once, and follow it by the remarks of the Nashville Editor and our own.

#### BANK CORRESPONDENCE,

With the United States Treasury Department.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,  
July 8th, 1834.

SIR:—I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3d inst. requesting that the dividend on the stock of the Bank owned by the United States, should be placed to the credit of the Treasurer of the United States at the office of this Bank in Washington, which was this morning submitted to the Board of Directors. At the same time was presented a copy of your letter to the cashier of that office, dated the 2d inst. containing the final refusal of the Treasury to allow the claim of the Bank for damages on the protested bill upon the French Government.

After due consideration of the contents of those communications, I am instructed by the board of directors to inform you, that from the dividend payable on the 17th of this month, there will be deducted the amount due to the bank for damages, costs, and interest, upon the bill of exchange drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury on the French Government—and that the remainder shall be placed to the credit of the Treasurer in the office at Washington, in conformity to your request.

I am further instructed to say, that this course is adopted by the board of directors, not merely from a conviction of the obvious justice and propriety of it, but because it furnishes the best, if not the only, mode of obtaining a judicial decision of the case by the proper tribunals. To procure that decision, the board will give every facility in their power—and if there is any other mode of submitting the rights of the respective parties to the judicial tribunals, more acceptable to you, any suggestion by you for that purpose will not fail to receive the prompt and respectful consideration of the board of directors. In the mean time, I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

N. BIDDLE, Pres't.

Hon. LEVI WOODBURY,  
Sec'y. of the Treasury, Washington.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES,  
July 8, 1834.

SIR:—I had this day the honor of informing you that the board of directors would deduct from the dividend payable to the United States, on the 17th of this month, the amount due to the Bank on account of damages on the bill of exchange on the French Government.

I am instructed to apprise you at the same time that in thus enforcing their right in this particular case, they desire not to be understood as waiving any other claim upon the Government, and they more especially wish it understood, that they do not waive their claim for full compensation and indemnity for the violation of the charter of the Bank, by the removal from its custody of the public funds, for the use of which the Bank had paid a valuable consideration. That claim is reserved in full force, to be asserted at such time and in such manner as may hereafter be deemed expedient. I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

N. BIDDLE, Pres't.

Hon. LEVI WOODBURY,  
Sec'y. of the Treasury, Washington.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT,  
July 14th, 1834.

SIR:—Your two communications under date of the 8th inst. have been received. The course pursued by the Bank over

which you preside, in determining to withhold a portion of the dividends due on the stock of the United States, has excited much surprise in this Department, and, at the present time, is more to be regretted, as Congress is not in session to provide for the deficiency thus caused in the estimated revenue from the bank stock the present year.

The claim for damages on the bill of exchange drawn upon France, to answer which it is stated that payment of part of the dividends is now refused, was disallowed by this Department before the two last dividends were passed to the credit of the Treasury, and some months before the recent session of Congress commenced. Consequently, it was presumed that the claim, if not abandoned, would be presented and pursued before that body, in the manner usual with claims against the United States, when the latter has not instituted any action at law against the claimant.

Besides these considerations, it could not have been anticipated as probable that all the dividends accruing would not be paid with promptitude and fidelity, when it was known that the case of a failure in a stockholder to discharge his subscription to the capital of the Bank, was the only case where the charter makes an express provision that he "shall lose the benefit of the dividends;" and in this instance, that the United States, though a large stockholder, was not pretended to have been guilty of any breach of this provision. Notwithstanding this, it would seem from your communications that the United States, though intimately connected with the Bank, by having conferred the great privileges in its charter, by still using it daily as a fiscal agent for certain purposes, and by being entitled to a supervision of its concerns through Congress, has suddenly, without previous notice, and only by an implied or constructive power, not in the opinion of this Department warranted or necessary, been deprived of the use of most of its dividends, and for the purpose of satisfying a controverted claim, the law and equity of which were many months since denied by the Executive, and have never been sanctioned by either of the other branches of Government established by the constitution.

In this condition of the subject, since the Bank did not deem it proper to present to Congress, the customary tribunal for settling such disputed demands against the United States—or, during its late session, to apprise either that body or this office of the extraordinary course intended to be pursued in thus seizing upon a large portion of the public dividends, while already in possession of more than a million of dollars belonging to the Government, but hitherto uncalled for by its creditors or the Treasury—this Department does not consider that it has yet enjoyed a suitable opportunity in relation to so unexpected a measure, to know the views or procure the desirable action of Congress; and, therefore, does not feel justified in making, at this time, any arrangement with the bank, or any "suggestion" in respect to legal prosecutions; nor in recognising, in any mode, "the justice or propriety" of the proceedings the Bank has been pleased to adopt.

But it will endeavor on the whole subject to present an early report to Congress at its next session, and to the President of the United States. In the mean time, if the Bank desires, before a report is prepared, that the facts and reasons in detail, on which its decisions and especially its claim for damages on the bill of exchange are founded, should be examined by this Department, the statement of them, whenever forwarded, will receive respectful consideration. I have the honor to be yours,

LEVI WOODBURY,  
Secretary of the Treasury.

N. BIDDLE, Esq.

Pres't. U. S. Bank, Philadelphia.

#### Remarks from the Nashville Republican.

WHAT NEXT!—From the correspondence above—a copy of which has been forwarded from Washington by the Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States; and which has been placed in our hands with permission to lay it before the public—it will be perceived that the *United States Bank has committed another outrage on public opinion and the interests of the people, by the seizure and conversion to its own use of a large portion of the dividends on the government stocks in that institution which fell due on the 1st July last.* The *pretext* for this unwarrantable step is the claim trumped up by the Bank for damages on the bill of exchange drawn by our Government on that of France, and protested by the latter—a claim, be it remembered, which was, after deliberate examination, *disallowed by the Treasury Department*—which was never laid before Congress, and which, it is believed, has not the shadow of justice, either in law or equity, to support it. What greatly aggravates the offence is, that *two dividends* have been placed by the Bank to the credit of the Government, since the claim was disallowed—a circumstance well calculated to induce the Government to believe that it either had been positively withdrawn, or at least that it would not again be preferred. Hence the *seizure, without the slightest*

*notice, has been wholly unexpected, and occasions a disarrangement of the estimated receipts for the current year.*

The suggestion of Mr. Biddle, that the Bank has been induced to take this step because it was the *readiest mode of bringing the question before a judicial tribunal*, might have been entitled to some consideration, had the Bank in the first place laid its application before *Congress*, the usual and appropriate tribunal for settling demands against the Government. It would have been time enough after Congress had passed upon and refused to allow the claim, for the Bank to have resorted to the *judicial tribunals for redress*; but this *taking the law into its own hands, or rather setting itself above all law*, is of a piece with the general conduct of the institution, and evinces in a peculiar and striking degree that reckless and arrogant spirit which has characterized its whole course.

The fact is, that at the time when the Bank advanced the money on the bill of exchange on France, it had in its possession a *much larger amount of the money of the people* which it was using for its own benefit. How then can it be pretended that any *damages* have been sustained? If this act of the Bank be sanctioned, to what may not the precedent lead? When the next and the next dividend shall be due and payable, what new and further claims may not Mr. Biddle set up? In his letter he expressly reserves *pretended claim on the part of the Bank for the damages it has sustained by the removal of the deposits*. If he can rightfully withhold the dividends of the government in one case, he can in the other. By and by he may claim damages for injuries occasioned to the bank by the general course of the President in *opposition to the institution*, and seize on the public funds by way of reparation. He may pretend to have been *slandered*, and sequester the People's money for the damages thereby received. In short, it may gradually become the *law, as well as the government*, and save the country the trouble and expense of administering either!

If there could have been any doubt originally about the propriety of removing the deposits, that doubt must surely be dispelled when it is seen that the money of the People which was placed for safe keeping in the Bank, is thus forcibly seized on and detained on pretence of an injury which every body knows was never sustained. The question is no longer *bank or no bank*, but *government or no government*, the two being wholly irreconcileable and inconsistent. The agent has assumed to set itself above the principal—the creature above the creator. It rests with the sovereign People to determine whether they will rule or be ruled.

The Washington Globe in republishing this extraordinary correspondence prefaces the whole thus:—

#### THE BANK AGAINST THE COUNTRY.

We are gratified to perceive, from the Nashville prints, that the President, on receiving copies of the letters which have lately passed between Mr. Biddle and the Secretary of the Treasury, promptly directed their publication. The public has been anxious to know how far the rumor, that the *Bank managers had confiscated the dividends accruing on the Government stock*, was to be credited; and the President, who has always looked upon it, that the Government, and all that relates to it, should be continually subjects to the supervision of the People, has not hesitated to expose to the country the new attitude which the Bank has assumed towards it.

The Bank government has thrown itself in the posture of a *foreign and independent Government* towards the Government of the People to which it owes its origin.

Like a foreign power, without appealing to Congress to indemnify it for any pretended or real wrong it may have sustained from the public authorities, it has boldly put forth its *letters of marque and reprisal—seized upon the public property—and confiscated it to satisfy damages which it has assumed the privilege to assess, by a judgment entered up against the Treasury by its Board of Directors*.

But this is not all—the sequestration from the Treasury of an amount of revenue to meet the *self-adjudicated damages* of the bank officers in the case of the French Bill (on which it made no advance and did not suffer a dollar of damage) is but a prelude to a still more extensive purloining of the public treasure. Mr. Biddle, in his second letter, says:

"I AM INSTRUCTED TO APPRISE YOU AT THE SAME TIME, THAT IN THIS ENFORCING THEIR RIGHT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THEY DESIRE NOT TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS WAIVING ANY OTHER CLAIM UPON THE GOVERNMENT; AND THEY MORE ESPECIALLY WISH IT UNDERSTOOD, THAT THEY DO NOT WAIVE THEIR CLAIM FOR FULL COMPENSATION AND INDEMNITY FOR THE VIOLATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE BANK, BY THE REMOVAL FROM ITS CUSTODY OF THE PUBLIC FUNDS, FOR THE USE OF WHICH THE BANK HAD PAID A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. THAT CLAIM IS RESERVED IN FULL FORCE, TO BE ASSERTED AT SUCH TIME AND IN SUCH A MANNER AS MAY HEREAFTER BE DEEMED EXPEDIENT."

What would be the condition of the country, if every individual were to take the course which this corporation of individuals has taken, and asserts an intention to persist in?

If every man who supposed he had suffered wrong from his Government, should undertake to say how much he had suffered, and *seize upon the public property*, with strong hand, wherever he could find it, to indemnify himself, would we have any longer a government of laws? If every soldier who may have lost a horse, and every merchant who may have lost a ship, by the act of the Government, should, without submitting his claim for indemnity to Congress, feel authorized to decide the amount of loss sustained by him, and to appropriate the Government's property wherever he could find it, to reimburse him, Mr. Clay might well proclaim that "we are in the midst of a revolution."

The BANK GOVERNMENT, in thus promulgating its *order of marque and reprisal* against the Government of the People, has two objects in view.

Mr. Biddle and his *junto* imagine, that to appease the rising wrath of the mammoth, and save some portion of the *seven millions* of capital stock of the Government, which the Bank has in possession, the nation will be induced to *make terms and grant a charter to secure its money*. Another object of the *audacious Directory* is, in case a charter cannot be extorted, to satisfy the private stockholders, whose representatives they are, that the vast out-lay they are making for that object, will be re-imbursed out of the public money. They mean to *make spoil of the government stock*, to *indemnify the private stockholders for the millions spent in waging the war for the perpetuation of their privileges*.

The aristocracy do not know how to estimate the character of the American People. This daring attempt, instead of producing submission, will only serve to increase the resistance of the People to this lawless institution.

This is the *clue* to the *labyrinth* of Federal mysteries of iniquity. Here the American people see before them, the powers with which they have to contend.

The Bank corrupts or cajoles a *majority* in the Senate. The Bank fails with the Executive.

The Bank fails with the House of Representatives.

The Bank labors to render the State banks subservient to its usurpation—and only partially succeeds. The Girard Bank, at first terrified by the *mammoth monster*, recovers its senses, and resumes the busines of its days of sanity. The most severe and vehement expressions of which our language is susceptible, would be *too mild* to characterize the flagrant insolence and audacity of the *Bank*, in this correspondence.

The hundreds of thousands which it has lavished in the corruption of *members of Congress*, the *purchase of the press*, and the oppression of the *community*, to *produce a panic*, are all wound up, and made a consistent whole, by the tenor of this correspondence.

The two papers, whose remarks we have quoted, have not seen this transaction in the same point of view which it presents itself to us.

*Thirty years ago*, we were accustomed to warn the public, to counsel them in time, before *time* had given the sanction of a weak prejudice to a menacing public evil. At that early period of our national existence, the *constitution of the Judiciary* was found in direct *competition* with the other two departments of constitutional authority. Now we have the realization of what was so long ago anticipated.

The *Judiciary* is itself the *neucleus of a faction*.

The *Judiciary* has been, from its origin, adverse to the principles of representative government.

The *Judiciary* has been the aider and abetter of laws repugnant to the Constitution, and to the principles of social order and equal justice.

The *Judiciary* has been in uniform concert or concord, with the adversaries of public freedom.

The *Judiciary* has constantly *acted*, whenever faction moved in opposition to the Constitution, and the social principles of equal right and justice.

Assuming powers of *common law*, which are denied to them, they have undertaken to *legislate*—they have, instead of resorting to the legitimate source, the people upon a question of amendment to any supposed defects of the existing Constitution, the *Judiciary* has, under the

pretext of *interpretation*, *LEGISLATED*; and always adverse to moral justice, to the principles of the government, and the rights of the people.

For example—their conduct on the infamous Yazoo's speculation:

Their admission of a fictitious case in the pretensions of Marbury, &c.

When the public administration was in the hands of men notoriously preferring *monarchy and hereditary institutions*, the *Judiciary* was an instrument of the governing authorities.

When the enormous abuses, violence and wickedness of men in power, aroused the people and expelled the tyrants, the *Judiciary* sided with the expelled despots, and its delegated power was exercised to coerce the free, and to put down the liberal.

It is not necessary to seek more than the memory thus calls up, in the mind of a witness to the wickedness he describes. A little research would furnish more details than the casual reader might have patience to peruse.

But here it is.—The *Bank* having failed through its corruption in the Senate, and in its attempts on the House of Representatives, now resorts to the *last strong hold of Federalism*—the *Judiciary*!

The *Bank* relies upon the *Judiciary*, and why?

The *Judiciary* is wholly independent of the people.

The *Judiciary* is irresponsible, for *impeachment* is a farce, forever abandoned.

The *Judiciary* calculates upon a total irresponsibility; and a change in the government, favorable to *Aristocracy*, would make it more necessary, more powerful, and more lucrative.

The *Judiciary* and the *Senate* combined while Congress sat in this city, to so alter the *government*, as to throw the whole power into their hands; the project was concocted at Mr. Bingham's, now the *Mansion House* hotel. There *fifteen* members of the *Senate* assembled, prepared a bill, altering the *Constitution*—and the *Senate*, as a body, never heard of it before it was introduced the next morning, ready printed.

It so happened that the editor of the *Aurora* had information of the design, and published the scheme before the *Senate* met; for which, the *Editor* was *arrested*, for giving an account of a designed usurpation and overthrow of the *Constitution*, the *conspirators* sitting in the house of a private individual—the minority of the *Senate* absent, and unapprized of the design, till it was broached to be baffled in the *Aurora*. For this the *editor* was brought before the *Senate*, and by a majority called upon to answer for publishing the *acts of the conspirators*.

The *Chief Justice* was to be the *PRESIDENT OF A COUNCIL OF FORTY*, and to elect the *President of the United States*.

One of those who were present related the whole of the occurrences to the *editor*; his name was never betrayed.

The *Bank* understands the *Judiciary*—their objects lead to the overthrow of Democracy, and converting the American people into *Italians* or *Venitians*.

From an insidious and heartless enemy—from dissimulation and professions, secret fraud and secret seduction, the *Bank* assumes the port of a *bully* and a *bandit*.

An Arabian Bedouin engaged camels to transport the treasury of the *Bey* of *Bagdad* to *Trebisond*. The *Bey* accompanies the costly caravan. They reach *Meshid*. The *Arab* informs the *Bey*—we were menaced with plunder, at *Abacout*: had you not my escort you must have paid a tribute per cent. at *Mossoul*. As we approached *Nineveh*, we were liable to pay twenty per cent. but you have escaped all these impositions, because you entrusted your business with me—and now you must pay me all that you must have paid, had I not led this caravan.—And such is the logic of the *Bank banditti*.

The public has, under a *fatal imposition*, invested an irresponsible body of men, with inordinate and detestable

powers. The simplicity of the *Constitution* never provided for such a case, because the founders never suspected, the possibility of so much wickedness.

There is no government in the Arabian desert, and no responsibility for outrage.

In the United States such crimes were never imagined—and laws are laughed at by the mere creatures of law.

The president of the *Bank* acts like the *Bedouin*.—There is indeed law at *Bagdad* and *Mossoul*, but there is none in the desert. The *Cauzis* are his cousins, and he cares not a fig for popular government; he will cheat the country—corrupt the populace, and make tools of them, and laugh at them after he has disgraced them!

The country, though awakened, is not yet broad enough awake to be prepared for the violence by which the *Bank* and the *lawyers* purpose to *bully* the *Government*, and terrify the people, as in the *Reign of Terror*; and no doubt contemplate such laws as those which prostrated the reputation of America at that shameless period,

#### PUBLIC HONOR—PUBLIC SAFETY!

The conduct of the *Bank*, in its latest act of defiance to the *Government* and *Laws of a Free People*, demands a **STRONG MEASURE**:—**THE PUBLIC SALE TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER OF THE UNITED STATES STOCK OF SEVEN MILLIONS** in that *Institution*—and such provisions as shall make the vast property lawlessly accumulated liable for all injuries inflicted on private persons.

#### POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

"When Judge McLean left the *Department* it was in a thriving condition."—This is the daily assertion of the opposition presses. What are the facts?—Facts speak for themselves.

Judge McLean, in his last report, dated Nov. 1828, says—"The receipts for the year ending July 1, 1828, were \$1,598,134 43—The expenditures for the same period were \$1,623,334 40."

From this statement which is not even subjected to contradiction, the *Department* was then in a sinking condition.

John Quincy Adams, in his message of Dec. 2, 1828, says, speaking of the *Post Office*—"The expenditures for a year exceeded the receipts over \$25,000."

Judge McLean, in a letter to Wm. T. Barry, 31st March, 1829, says—"The expenditures of the *Department* will this year exceed the receipts as was the case last year."

It should be recollected, that the period here referred to, was under the management of Judge McLean. The Judge says to Mr. Barry, "The expenditures will exceed the receipts," &c. This was said by Mr. McLean, with all the facts relating to the office then fresh in his memory. He knew the expenditures under him were eating up all the receipts, and more too.

Now in the face of these facts, the opposition say the *General Post Office* was doing wonders until it came into the hands of W. T. Barry. In the late Report of Ewing & Co. against the *Department*, it is said the *Department* now ought to produce annually about \$500,000 surplus. This is what the opposition are continually suggesting would be the fact if Mr. McLean was at the head of the *Department*. They appear not to see that they are contradicting the Judge's own words, "that the expenditures would exceed the receipts."

Mr. Barry, in his late address to the people, speaking of his *Department* as it came from the hands of Mr. McLean to him, says:

"The late Postmaster General in his Report dated Nov. 17, 1828, shows that instead of saving 500,000 dollars the expenses of his *Department* from the 1st of July, 1827 to the first of July, 1828, were upwards of 25,000 dollars more than all its revenues for the same period; and that he had entered into contracts to take effect from the 1st of January 1829, which involved the *Department* in an expense for the period of only six months from the 1st of January to the 1st of July 1829, of \$40,778 55 more than all its revenue for the same time; and that the expenses of the *Department* for the year commencing the 1st of July, 1828, were \$74,714 15 more than its revenues, and that the excess of expenditure, together with the losses sustained, had diminished the finances of the *Department*, within one year to the amount of \$101,266 03. In this state of things I had no agency. It was produced before I came into office."—*Maine Age*.

## BANK OF THE UNITED STATES.

## SPEECH OF MR. BENTON,—OF MISSOURI,

*Delivered in the Senate of the United States, on asking leave to introduce a Joint Resolution against the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States.*

FEBRUARY 2D, 1831.

In pursuance of the notice which he had given, Mr. BENTON rose to ask leave to introduce a Joint Resolution, declaring it to be the sense of Congress that the charter of the Bank of the United States ought not to be renewed. He commenced his speech in support of the application for the leave he was about to ask, with a justification of himself for bringing forward the question of renewal at this time, when the charter had still five years to run; and bottomed his vindication chiefly on the right he possessed, and the necessity he was under, to answer certain Reports of one of the Committees of the Senate, made in opposition to certain resolutions relative to the Bank, which he had submitted to the Senate at former sessions; and which reports he had not an opportunity of answering. He said it had been his fortune or chance, some three years ago, to submit a resolution in relation to the undrawn balances of the public money in the hands of the Bank, and to accompany it with some poor remarks of unfavorable implication to the future existence of that institution. My resolution, said Mr. B. was referred to the Committee on Finance, who made a report decidedly adverse to all my views, and eminently favorable to the Bank, both as a present and future institution. This report came in on the 13th of May—just fourteen days before the conclusion of a six months' session, when all was hurry and precipitation to terminate the business on hand, and when there was not the least chance to engage the attention of the Senate in the consideration of any new subject. The report was, therefore, laid upon the table unanswered; but was printed by the order of the Senate, and that in extra numbers, and widely diffused over the country by means of the newspaper press. At the commencement of the next session, it being irregular to call for the consideration of the past report, I was under the necessity to begin anew; and accordingly submitted my resolution a second time, and that quite early in the session; say, on the first day of January. It was my wish and request that this resolution might be discussed in the Senate; but the sentiment of the majority was different; and a second reference of it was made to the Finance Committee. A second report, of the same purport with the first, was a matter of course: but what did not seem to me to be a matter of course, was this: that this second report should not come in until the 20th of February; just fourteen days again, before the end of the session, for it was then the short session, and the Senate as much pinched as before for time to finish the business on hand. No answer could be made to it; but the report was printed, with the former report appended to it; and thus, united like the Siamese twins, and with the apparent, but not real sanction of the Senate, they went forth together to make the tour of the Union in the columns of the newspaper press. Thus, I was a second time out of court; a second time non-suited for want of a replication, when there was no time to file one. I had intended to begin *de novo*, and for the third time, at the opening of the ensuing session; but happily, was anticipated and prevented by the annual message of the new President, (GEN. JACKSON,) which brought the question of renewing the Bank charter directly before Congress. A reference of this part of the message was made, of course, to the Finance Committee: the committee, of course, again reported, and with increased ardor, in favor of the Bank. Unhappily this third report, which was an amplification and reiteration of the two former, did not come in until the session was four months advanced, and when the time of the Senate had become engrossed, and its attention absorbed by the numerous and important subjects which had accumulated upon the calendar. Printing in extra numbers, general circulation through the newspaper press, and no answer, was the catastrophe of this third reference to the Finance Committee. Thus was I non-suited for the third time. The fourth session has now come round; the same subject is again before the same committee on the reference of the part of the President's second annual message which relates to the Bank; and doubtless, a fourth report of the same import with the three preceding ones, may be expected. But when, is the question! And as I cannot answer that question, and the session is now two-thirds advanced, and as I have no disposition to be cut off for the fourth time, I have thought proper to create an occasion to deliver my own sentiments, by asking leave to introduce a Joint Resolution, adverse to the tenor of all the reports, and to give my reasons against them, while supporting my application for the leave demanded: a course of proceeding which is just to myself, and unjust to no one, since all are at liberty to answer me. These are my personal reasons for this step, and part of my answer to the objection that I have begun too soon.

The conduct of the Bank, and its friends, constitutes the second branch of my justification. It is certainly not "too soon" for them, judging by their conduct, to engage in the question of renewing the Bank charter.—In, and out of, Congress, they all seem to be of one accord on this point. Three reports of committees in the Senate, and one from a committee of the House of Representatives, have been in favor of the renewal; and, all these reports, instead of being laid away for future use,—instead of being stuck in pigeon holes, and labeled for future attention,—as things coming forth prematurely, and not wanted for present service,—have, on the contrary, been universally received: by the Bank and its friends, in one great tempest of applause; greeted with every species of acclamation; reprinted in most of the papers, and every effort made to give the widest diffusion, and the highest effect, to the arguments they contain. In addition to this, and at the present session, within a few days past, 3000 copies of the exposition of the affairs of the Bank have been printed by order of the two Houses, a thing never before done, and now intended to blazon the merits of the Bank. (Mr. SMITH, of Maryland, here expressed some dissent to this statement; but Mr. B. affirmed its correctness in substance, if not to the letter, and continued.)—This does not look as if the Bank advocates thought it was *too soon* to discuss the question of renewing the charter; and, upon this exhibition of their sentiments, I shall rest the assertion, and the proof, that they do not think so. The third branch of my justification rests upon a sense of public duty,—upon a sense of what is just and advantageous to the people in general, and to the debtors and stock holders of the Bank in particular. The renewal of the charter is a question which concerns the people at large; and if they are to have any hand in the decision of this question, if they are even to know what is done before it is done, it is high time that they, and their representatives in Congress, should understand each others mind upon it. The charter has but five years to run; and, if renewed at all, will probably be at some short period; say, two or three years before the time is out; and at any time sooner that a chance can be seen to gallop the renewal through Congress. The people, therefore, have no time to lose, if they mean to have any hand in the decision of this great question. To the Bank itself, it must be advantageous, (at least,) if not desirable, to know its fate at once, that it may avoid, (if there is to be no renewal,) the trouble and expense of multiplying branches upon the eve of dissolution, and the risk and inconvenience of extending loans beyond the term of its existence. To the debtors upon mortgages, and indefinite accommodations, it must be also advantageous, if not desirable, to be notified in advance of the end of their indulgences: so that to every interest, public and private, political and pecuniary, general and particular, full discussion, and seasonable decision, is just and proper.

I hold myself justified, Mr. PRESIDENT, upon the reasons given, for proceeding in my present application; but as example is sometimes more authoritative than reason, I will take the liberty to produce one which is as high in point of authority, as it is appropriate in point of application, and which happens to fit the case before the Senate as completely as if it had been made for it. I speak of what has lately been done in the Parliament of Great Britain. It so happens that the charter of the Bank of England is to expire upon its own limitation nearly about the same time with the charter of the Bank of the United States, namely, in the year 1833; and, as far back as 1824, no less than nine years before its expiration, the question of its renewal was debated, and that with great freedom, in the British House of Commons. I will read some extracts from that debate, as the fairest way of presenting the example to the Senate, and the most effectual mode of securing to myself the advantage of the sentiments expressed by the British statesmen.

## THE EXTRACTS.

Sir Henry Parnell. "The House should no longer delay to turn its attention to the expediency of renewing the charter of the Bank of England. Heretofore, it had been the regular custom to renew the charter several years before the existing charter had expired. The last renewal was made when the existing charter had eleven years to run: the present charter had nine years only to continue, and he felt very anxious to prevent the making of any agreement between the Government and the Bank for a renewal, without a full examination of the policy of again conferring upon the Bank of England any exclusive privilege. The practice had been for government to make a secret arrangement with the Bank; to submit it immediately to the proprietors of the Bank for their approbation, and to call upon the House the next day to confirm it; without affording any opportunity of fair deliberation. So much information had been obtained upon the banking trade, and upon the nature of currency in the last fifteen years, that it was particularly necessary to enter upon a full investigation of the policy of renewing the Bank charter, before any negotiation should be entered upon between the government and the Bank: and he trusted the government

would not commence any such negotiation, until the sense of Parliament had been taken on this important subject."

"Mr. Hume said it was of very great importance that his majesty's ministers should take immediate steps to free themselves from the trammels in which they had long been held by the Bank. As the interest of money was now nearly on a level with what it was when the Bank lent a large sum to government, he hoped the chancellor of the Exchequer would not listen to any application for a renewal of the Bank charter, but would pay off every shilling that had been borrowed from the Bank. . . . . Let the country, gentlemen recollect that the Bank was now acting as a pawn broker on a large scale, and lending money on estates, a system entirely contrary to the original intention of that institution. . . . . He hoped, before the expiration of the charter, that a regular inquiry would be made into the whole subject."

Mr. Edward Ellice. "It (the Bank of England) is a great monopolizing body, enjoying privileges which belonged to no other corporation; and to no other class of his majesty's subjects. . . . . He hoped that the exclusive charter would never again be granted, and that the conduct of the Bank during the last ten or twelve years, would make government very cautious how they entertained any such propositions. The right honorable Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Robinson) had protested against the idea of straining any point to the prejudice of the Bank: he thought, however, that the bank had very little to complain of, when their stock, after all their past profits, was at 238.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, "Depreciated the discussion, as leading to no practical result."

Mr. Alexander Baring, "Objected to it as premature and unnecessary."

Sir William Pulteney (in another debate.) "The prejudices in favor of the present Bank have proceeded from the long habit of considering it as a sort of pillar which nothing can shake. . . . . The bank has been supported, and is still supported, by the fear and terror which, by means of its monopoly, it has had the power to inspire. It is well known that there is hardly an extensive trader, a manufacturer, or a banker, either in London, or a distance from it, to whom the Bank could not do a serious injury, and could often bring on even insolvency. . . . . I consider the power given by the monopoly to be of the nature of all other despotic power, which corrupts the despots as much as it corrupts the slave. . . . . It is in the nature of man that a monopoly must necessarily be ill conducted."

Whatever language the (private) bankers may feel themselves obliged to hold, yet no one can believe that they have any satisfaction in being, and continuing, under a dominion which has proved so grievous and so disastrous. . . . . I can never believe that the merchants and bankers of this country will prove unwilling to emancipate themselves, if they can do it without risking the resentment of the Bank. No man in France was heard to complain, openly, of the *Bastile* while it existed. The merchants and bankers of this country, have the blood of Englishmen, and will be happy to relieve themselves from a situation of perpetual terror, if they could do it consistently with a due regard to their own interest."

Here is authority added to reason,—the force of a great example added to the weight of unanswerable reasons, in favor of early discussion. So that, I trust, I have effectually put aside that old and convenient objection to the "time,"—and most flexible and accommodating objection which applies to all seasons, and all subjects, and is just as available for cutting off a late debate, because it is too late, as it is for stifling an early one, because it is too early.

But it is said the debate will injure the stockholders, that it depreciates the value of their property, and that it is wrong to sport with the vested rights of individuals. This complaint, supposing it to come from the stockholders themselves, is both absurd and ungrateful. It is absurd, because the stockholders themselves, at least so many of them as are not foreigners, must have known when they accepted a charter of limited duration, that the approach of its expiration would renew the debate upon the propriety of its existence; that every citizen had a right, and every public man was under an obligation, to declare his sentiments freely; that there was nothing in the charter, numerous as its peculiar privileges were, to exempt the Bank from that freedom of speech and writing which extends to all our public affairs; and that the charter was not to be renewed here, as the Bank of England charter had formerly been renewed, by a private arrangement amongst its friends, suddenly produced in Congress, and galloped through without the knowledge of the country. The American part of the stockholders, (for I would not reply to the complaints of the foreigners,) must have known all this; and known it when they accepted the charter. They accepted, subject to this known consequence; and, therefore, the complaint about injuring their property, is absurd.—That it is ungrateful, must be apparent to all who will reflect upon the great privileges

which these stockholders will have enjoyed for twenty years, and the large profits they have already derived from their charter. They have been dividing seven per cent. per annum, unless when prevented by their own mismanagement; and have laid up a real estate of three millions of dollars for future division; and the money which has done these handsome things, instead of being diminished or impaired in the process, is still worth largely upwards of 100 cents to the dollar; say, 125 cents. For the peculiar privileges which enabled them to make these profits, the stockholders ought to be grateful; but, like all persons who have been highly favoured with undue benefits, they mistake a privilege for a right,—a favor for a duty,—and resent, as an attack upon their property, a refusal to prolong their undue advantages. There is no ground for these complaints, but for thanks and benedictions rather, for permitting the Bank to live out its numbered days! That institution has forfeited its charter. It may be shut up at any hour. It lives from day to day by the indulgence of those whom it daily attacks; and if any one is ignorant of this fact, let him look at the case of the Bank of the United States against Owens and others, decided in the Supreme Court, and reported in 2d Peters'.

(Here Mr. B. read a part of this case, showing that it was a case of usury at the rate of 46 per cent. and that Mr. Sergeant, counsel for the Bank, resisted the decision of the Supreme Court upon the ground that it would expose the charter of the Bank to forfeiture; and that the decision was, nevertheless, given upon that ground, so that the Bank, being convicted of taking usury in violation of its charter, was liable to be deprived of its charter at any time that a *Scire Facias* should issue against it.)

Mr. B. resumed:

Before I proceed to the consideration of the Resolution, I wish to be indulged in advertizing to a rule, or principle, of parliamentary practice, which it is only necessary to read now in order to avoid the possibility of any necessity for recurring to it hereafter. It is the rule which forbids any member to be present,—which in fact requires him to withdraw,—during the discussion of any question in which his private interest may be concerned; and authorizes the expurgation from the Journal of any vote which may have been given under the predicament of an interested motive. I demand that the Secretary of the Senate may read the rule to which I allude.

(*The Secretary reads.*)

THE RULE.

"Where the private interests of a member are concerned in a bill, or question, he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary, not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principles of the social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause, it is for the honor of the house that this rule of immemorial observance, should be strictly adhered to."

I. Mr. PRESIDENT, I object to the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States, because I look upon the Bank as an institution too great and powerful to be safely tolerated in a government of free and equal laws.

Its power is that of the purse: a power more potent than that of the sword: and this power it possesses to a degree and extent that will enable this bank to draw to itself too much of the political power of this Union, and too much of the individual property of the citizens of these States.

The money power of the Bank is both direct and indirect.

(The Vice President here intimated to Mr. B. that he was out of order, and had not a right to go into the merits of the Bank upon the motion which he had made. Mr. B. begged the pardon of the Vice President, and respectfully insisted that he was in order and had a right to proceed. He said he was proceeding upon the parliamentary rule of asking leave to bring in a Joint Resolution, and in doing which he had a right to state his reasons, which reasons constituted his speech; that the motion was debatable, and the whole Senate might answer him. The Vice President then directed Mr. B. to proceed.)

Mr. B. resumed.

The direct power of the Bank is now prodigious; and, in the event of the renewal of the charter, must speedily become boundless and uncontrollable. The Bank is now authorized to own effects, lands inclusive, to the amount of fifty-five millions of dollars, and to issue notes to the amount of thirty-five millions more. This makes ninety millions; and, in addition to this vast sum, there is a dispensation in the charter to issue as many more notes, as Congress by law may permit. This opens the door to boundless emissions, for what can be more unbounded than the will and pleasure of successive Congresses?—The indirect power of the Bank cannot be stated in figures; but it can be shown to be immense. In the first place, it has the keeping of the public monies now amounting to twenty-six millions per annum, (the Post Office Department included,) and the gratuitous use of the undrawn

balances, large enough to constitute, in themselves, the capital of a great State Bank. In the next place, its promissory notes are receivable, by law, in purchase of all property owned by the United States, and in payment of all debts due them, and this may increase its power to the amount of the annual revenue, by creating a demand for its notes to that amount. In the third place, it wears the *name* of the United States, and has the Federal Government for a *partner*, and this name, and this partnership, identifies the credit of the Bank with the credit of the Union. In the fourth place, it is armed with authority to disparage and discredit the notes of other banks, by excluding them from all payments to the United States; and this, added to all its other powers, direct and indirect, makes this institution the uncontrollable monarch of the monied system of the Union.—To whom is all this power granted? To a company of private individuals, many of them foreigners, and the mass of them residing in a remote and narrow corner of the Union, unconnected by any sympathy with the fertile regions of the **GREAT VALLEY**, in which the natural power of this Union,—the power of numbers,—will be found to reside long before the renewed term of a second charter would expire. By whom is all this power to be exercised? By a Directory, of seven (it may be,) governed by a majority of four, (it may be,) and none of these elected by the people, or responsible to them. Where is it to be exercised? At a single city, distant a thousand miles from some of the States, receiving the produce of none of them (except one;) no commerce with the people; with branches in every state; and every branch subject to the secret and absolute orders of the Supreme Central head; thus constituting a system of **CENTRALISM**, hostile to the federative principle of our Union, encroaching upon the wealth and power of the States, and organized upon a principle to give the highest effect to the greatest power.—This mass of power, thus concentrated, thus ramified, and thus directed, must necessarily become, under a prolonged existence, the absolute monopolist of American money, the sole manufacturer of paper currency, and the sole authority, for authority it will be, to which the Federal Government, the State Governments, the great cities, corporate bodies, merchants, traders, and every private citizen, must, of necessity apply, for every loan which their exigencies, may demand.—**THE RICH RULETH THE POOR, AND THE BORROWER IS THE SERVANT OF THE LENDER.** Such are the words of Holy Writ, and if the authority of the Bible admitted of corroboration, the history of the world is at hand to give it. But I will not cite the history of the world, but one eminent example only, and that of a nature so high and commanding, as to include all others, and so near and recent, as to be directly applicable to our own situation. I speak of what happened in Great Britain, in the year 1795, when the Bank of England, by a brief and unceremonious letter to Mr. Pitt, such as a miser would write to a prodigal in pinch, gave the proof of what a great monied power *could* do, and *would* do, to promote its own interest, in a crisis of national alarm and difficulty. I will read the letter. It is exceedingly short; for after the compliments are omitted, there are but three lines of it. It is, in fact, about as long as a sentence of execution, leaving out the prayer of the judge. It runs thus:—

"It is the wish of the Court of Directors, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would settle his arrangements of finances, for the present year, in such manner as not to depend upon any further assistance from them beyond what is already agreed for."

Such were the words of this memorable note, sufficiently explicit and intelligible; but to appreciate it fully we must know what was the condition of Great Britain at that time. Remember it was in the year '95, and the beginning of that year, than which a more portentous one never opened upon the British empire. The war with the French Republic had been raging for two years,—Spain had just declared war against Great Britain,—Ireland was bursting into rebellion,—the fleet at the Nore was in open mutiny,—and a cry for reform of abuses, and the reduction of taxes, resounded through the land. It was a season of alarm and consternation, and imminent actual danger to Great Britain; and this was the moment which the Bank selected to notify the minister that no more loans were to be expected! What was the effect of this notification? It was to paralyze the Government and to subdue the minister to the purposes of the Bank. From that day forth, Mr. Pitt became the minister of the Bank; and before two years were out, he had succeeded in bringing all the departments of the Government, King, Lords, and Commons, and the Privy Council, to his own slavish condition. He stopped the specie payments of the Bank, and made its notes the lawful currency of the land. In '97 he obtained an order in council for this purpose; in the same year an act of Parliament to confirm the order for a month, and afterwards a series of acts to continue it for twenty years. This was the reign of the Bank. For twenty years it was a dominant power in England, and during that disastrous period, the public debt was increased about £400,000,000 sterling, equal to two thousand millions of dollars, and that by paper loans from a Bank, which, according to its own declaration,

had not a shilling to lend at the commencement of the period! I omit the rest. I say nothing of the general subjugation of the country Banks, the rise in the prices of food, the decline in wages, the increase of crimes and taxes, the multiplication of lords and beggars, and the frightful demoralization of society. I omit all this. I only seize the prominent figure in the picture, *that of a government ARRESTED in the midst of WAR and DANGER by the VETO of a MONIED CORPORATION*; and only permitted to go on upon condition of assuming the odium of stopping specie payments, and sustaining the promissory notes of an insolvent Bank, as the lawful currency of the land. This simple figure suffices to fix the character of the times; for when the Government becomes the "servant of the lender," the people themselves become its slaves. Cannot the Bank of the United States, if re-chartered, act in the same way? It certainly can, and just as certainly will, when time and opportunity shall serve, and interest may prompt. It is to no purpose that gentlemen vaunt the character of the United States Bank, and proclaim it too just and merciful to oppress the State. I must be permitted to repudiate both the pledge and the praise. The security is insufficient; and the encomium belongs to Constantinople. There were enough such in the British Parliament the year before, nay, the day before, the Bank stopped; yet their pledges and praises neither prevented the stoppage, nor made good the damage that ensued. There were gentlemen in our Congress to pledge themselves in 1810 for the then expiring Bank, of which the one now existing is a second and deteriorated edition, and if their securityship had been accepted, and the old bank re-chartered, we should have seen this Government greeted with a note about August, 1814—about the time the British were burning this capital—of the same tenor with the one received by the younger Pitt in the year '95; for it is incontestable, that the Bank was owned by men who would have gloried in arresting the Government, and the war itself, for want of money. Happily, the wisdom and patriotism of Jefferson, under the providence of God, prevented that infamy and ruin, by preventing the renewal of the old bank charter.

II. I object to the continuance of this Bank, because its *tendencies* are dangerous and pernicious to the Government and the people.

What are the tendencies of a great monied power, connected with the Government, and controlling its fiscal operations? Are they not dangerous to every interest, public and private—political as well as pecuniary? I say they are, and briefly enumerate the heads of each mischief.

1. Such a Bank tends to subjugate the Government, as I have already shown in the history of what happened to the British minister in the year '95.

2. It tends to collusions between the Government and the Bank in the terms of the loans, as has been fully experienced in England in those frauds upon the people, and insults upon the understanding, called three per cent. loans, in which the government for about £50 borrowed, became liable to pay £109.

3. It tends to create public debt, by facilitating public loans, and substituting unlimited supplies of paper for limited supplies of coin. The British debt is born of the Bank of England. That Bank was chartered in 1694, and was nothing more nor less in the beginning, than an act of Parliament for the incorporation of a company of subscribers to a government loan. The loan was £1,200,000; the interest £30,000; and the expenses of management £4,000. And this is the birth and origin, the germ and nucleus, of that debt which is now £900,000,000, (the unfunded items included) which bears an interest of £30,000,000, and costs £250,000 for annual management.

4. It tends to beget and prolong unnecessary wars, by furnishing the means of carrying them on without recurrence to the people. England is the ready example for this calamity. Her wars for the restoration of the *Capet Bourbons* were kept up by loans and subsidies created out of Bank paper. The people of England had no interest in these wars, which cost them about £600,000,000 of debt in twenty-five years, in addition to the supplies raised within the year. The kings she put back upon the French throne were not able to sit on it. Twice she put them on, twice they tumbled off in the mud; and all that now remains of so much sacrifice of life and money is, the debt which is eternal, the taxes which are intolerable, the pensions and titles of some warriors, and the keeping of the *Capet Bourbons*, who are returned upon their hands.

5. It tends to aggravate the inequality of fortunes—to make the rich richer, and the poor poorer—to multiply nabobs and paupers—and to deepen and widen the gulf which separates *Dives* from *LAZARUS*. A great monied power is favorable to great capitalists; for it is the principle of money to eschew the needy and unfortunate. It is injurious to the laboring classes; because they receive no favor, and have the price of the property they wish to acquire raised to the paper maximum, while wages remain at the money maximum.

6. It tends to make and to break fortunes, by the flux and the

reflux of paper. Profuse issues and sudden contractions, perform this operation, which can be repeated, like planetary and pestilential visitations, in every cycle of so many years, at every periodical return, transferring millions from the actual possessors of property to the Neptunes who preside over the flux and reflux of paper. The last operation of this kind performed by the Bank of England, about five years ago, was described by Mr. Alexander Baring in the House of Commons, in terms which are entitled to the knowledge and remembrance of American citizens. I will read his description, which is brief but impressive. After describing the profuse issues in 1823, '24, he painted the re-action in the following terms:

"They, therefore, all at once gave a sudden jerk to the horse, on whose neck they had before suffered the reins to hang loose. They contracted their issues to a considerable extent. The change was at once felt throughout the country. A few days before that, no one knew what to do with his money: now no one knew where to get it.

"The London Bankers found it necessary to follow the same course towards their country correspondents, and these again towards their customers, and each individual towards his debtor.—The consequence was obvious in the late panic. Every one, desirous to obtain what was due to him, ran to his banker, or to any other on whom he had a claim; and even those who had no immediate use for their money, took it back, and let it lie unemployed in their pockets, thinking it unsafe in others' hands. The effect of this alarm was, that houses which were weak, went immediately. Then went second rate houses; and, lastly, houses which were solvent went, because their securities were unavailable. The daily calls to which each individual was subject, put it out of his power to assist his neighbor. Men were known to seek for assistance, and that, too, without finding it, who on examination of their affairs, were proved to be worth, 200,000 pounds—men, too, who held themselves so secure, that, if asked six months before, whether they could contemplate such an event, they would say it would be impossible, unless the sky should fall, or some other event, equally improbable should occur."

This is what was done in England five years ago,—it is what may be done here in every five years to come, if the Bank Charter is renewed. Sole dispenser of money, it cannot omit the oldest and most obvious means of amassing wealth by the flux and reflux of paper. The game is in its own hands; and the only answer to be given is, that to which I have alluded: "*The Sultan is too just and merciful to abuse his power.*"

III. I object to the renewal of the Charter, Mr. President, on account of the exclusive privileges, and anti-republican monopoly, which it gives to the stockholders. It gives, and that by an act of Congress, to a company of individuals, the exclusive legal privileges;—

1. To carry on the trade of banking upon the revenue and credit, and in the name, of the United States of America.

2. To pay the revenues of the Union in their own promissory notes.

3. To hold the monies of the United States in deposit, without making compensation for the undrawn balances.

4. To discredit and disparage the notes of other banks, by excluding them from the collection of the Federal revenue.

5. To hold real estate, receive rents, and retain a body of tenantry,

6. To deal in pawns, merchandise, and bills of exchange.

7. To establish branches in the States without their consent.

8. To be exempt from liability on the failure of the Bank.

9. To have the United States for a partner.

10. To have foreigners for partners.

11. To be exempt from the regular administration of justice for the violations of their charter.

12. To have all these exclusive privileges secured to them as a monopoly, in a pledge of the public faith not to grant the like privileges to any other company.

These are the privileges, and this the monopoly, of the Bank. Now, let us examine them, and ascertain their effect and bearing. Let us contemplate the magnitude of the power which they create; and ascertain the compatibility of this power with the safety of the Republican Government, and the rights and interests of its free and equal constituents.

1. The name, the credit, and the revenues of the United States, are given up to the use of this company, and constitute in themselves an immense capital to bank upon.—The *name* of the United States, like that of the King, is a tower of strength; and this strong tower is now an outwork to defend the citadel of a monied corporation. The *credit* of the Union is incalculable; and, of this credit, as going with the name, and being in partnership with the United States, the same corporation now has possession.—The *revenues* of the Union are twenty-six millions of dollars, including the Post Office; and all this is so much capital in the hands of the Bank, because the revenue is received by it, and is payable in its promissory notes.

2. To pay the revenues of the United States in their own notes, until Congress shall otherwise order and direct.—This is a part of the charter, incredible and extraordinary as it may appear. The promissory notes of the Bank are to be received in payment of every thing the United States may have to sell,—in discharge of every debt due to her, until Congress, by law, shall otherwise direct; so that, if this Bank, like its prototype in England, should stop payment, its promissory notes would still be receivable at every custom-house, land office, post office, and by every collector of public monies, throughout the Union, until Congress shall meet, pass a repealing law, and promulgate the repeal.—Other banks depend upon their credit for the receivability of their notes; but this favored institution has law on its side, and a chartered right to compel the reception of its paper by the Federal Government. The immediate consequence of this extraordinary privilege is, that the United States becomes virtually bound to stand security for the Bank, as much so as if she had signed a bond to that effect, and must stand forward to sustain the institution in all emergencies, in order to save her own revenue. This is what has already happened, some ten years ago, in the early progress of the Bank, and when the immense aid given it by the Federal Government enabled it to survive the crisis of its own overwhelming mismanagement.

3. To hold the monies of the United States in deposit, without making compensation for the use of the undrawn balances.—This is a right which I deny; but, as the Bank claims it, and what is more material enjoys it; and as the people of the United States have suffered to a vast extent in consequence of this claim and enjoyment, I shall not fail to set it down to the account of the Bank. Let us then examine the value of this privilege; and its effect upon the interest of the community; and, in the first place, let us have a full and accurate view of the amount of these undrawn balances, from the establishment of the Bank to the present day. Here it is! Look! Read!

Years.	1st Quarter.	2d Quarter.	3d Quarter.	4th Quarter.	Average.		
						Overdrawn	Undrawn
1817	11,485,520.76	15,935,050.36	5,635,568.68	7,404,336.07	10,115,118.97		
1818	6,686,387.71	6,895,210.05	6,910,536.83	5,434,468.70	5,246,475.82		
1819	487,637.70	1,500,035.82	310,942.75	908,566.55	501,770.70		
1820	1,781,976.08	946,115.17	1,390,349.61	388,210.94	1,126,065.45		
1821	* Overdrawn	754,962.41	761,468.54	256,953.41	182,211.11		
1822	1,021,523.74	1,406,112.48	1,826,605.42	1,852,535.82	1,551,694.36		
1823	2,759,000.70	5,630,372.84	6,409,577.80	6,862,058.14	5,415,252.37		
1824	5,429,432.88	5,252,004.44	4,906,814.02	* Overdrawn	3,767,335.31		
1825	3,994,757.66	6,116,027.30	1,122,118.97	3,101,776.20	3,583,670.03		
1826	4,682,375.25	1,586,604.23	3,836,165.86	3,537,026.58			
1827	4,644,375.84	2,352,843.90	3,747,731.71	4,400,738.84	3,864,422.57		
1828	6,464,089.79	3,775,094.46	5,231,364.42	4,107,429.89	4,895,244.64		
1829	6,401,103.07	2,721,968.47	4,413,574.95	3,765,102.96	4,825,437.36		
30 June 1830	5,721,526.71	2,250,664.92			3,986,095.82		
					* 518,910.09		
						* 1,044,589.91	

See, Mr. President, what masses of money! and always on hand. The paper is covered all over with millions. And yet, for all these vast sums, no interest is allowed, no compensation is made to the United States. The Bank of England, for the undrawn balances of the public money, has made an equitable compensation to the British government, namely, a permanent loan of half a million sterling, and a temporary loan of three millions for twenty years, without interest. Yet, when I moved for such a compensation to the United States, the proposition was utterly rejected by the Finance Committee, and treated as an attempt to violate the charter of the Bank!—At the same time, it is incontestable, that the United States have been borrowing these undrawn balances from the Bank, and paying an interest upon their own money. I think we can identify one of these loans. Let us try. In May 1824, Congress authorized a loan of five millions of dollars to pay the awards under the treaty with Spain, commonly called the Florida treaty. The

Bank of the United States took that loan, and paid the money for the United States in January and March, 1825. In looking over the statement of undrawn balances, it will be seen that they amounted to near four millions at the end of the first, and six millions at the end of the second quarter of that year. The inference is irresistible, and I leave every senator to make it; only adding that we have paid \$1,463,875 in interest upon that loan, either to the Bank or its transferees.—This is a strong case, but I have a stronger one. It is known to every body that the United States subscribed seven millions to the capital stock of the Bank, for which she gave her stock note, bearing an interest of five per cent. per annum. I have a statement from the Register of the Treasury, from which it appears that up to the 30th day of June last, the United States had paid \$4,725,000 in interest upon that note; when it is proved by the statement of balances exhibited, that the United States, for the whole period in which that interest was accruing, had the half, or the whole, and once the double, of these seven millions in the hands of the Bank. This is a stronger case than that of the five million loan, but it is not the strongest. The strongest case is this: In the year 1817, when the Bank went into operation, the United States owed, among other debts, a sum of about fourteen millions and three quarters, bearing an interest of three per cent. In the same year the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund were authorized by an act of Congress to purchase that stock at 65 per cent. which was then its market price. Under this authority the amount of about one million and a half was purchased; the remainder, amounting to about thirteen millions and a quarter, has continued unpurchased to this day; and after costing the United States about six millions in interest since 1817, the stock has risen about four millions in value, that is to say, from 65 to nearly 95. Now here is a clear loss of ten millions of dollars to the United States. In 1817 she could have paid off thirteen millions and a quarter of debt, with eight millions and a half of dollars; now, after paying six millions of interest, it would require twelve million and a half to pay off the same debt. By referring to the statement of undrawn balances, it will be seen that the United States had, during the whole year of 1817, an average sum of above ten millions of dollars in the hands of the United States Bank, being a million and a half more than enough to have bought in the whole of the three per cent. stock. The question, therefore, naturally comes up, why was it not applied to the redemption of these 13 millions and a quarter, according to the authority contained in the Act of Congress of that year? Certainly the Bank needed the money; for it was just getting into operation, and was as hard run to escape bankruptcy about that time as any Bank that ever was saved from the brink of destruction. This is the largest injury which we have sustained on account of accommodating the Bank with the gratuitous use of these vast deposits; but, to shew myself impartial, I will now state the smallest case of injury that has come within my knowledge. It is the case of the *bonus* of fifteen hundred thousand dollars which the Bank was to pay to the United States in three equal annual instalments, for the purchase of its charter. Nominally this *bonus* has been paid, but out of what monies? Certainly out of our own; for the statement shows our money was there; and further shows that it is still there; for on the 30th day of June last, which is the latest return, there was still \$2,550,664 in the hands of the Bank, which is above \$750,000 more than the amount of the *bonus*.

[Continuation in next number.]

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